Abstract-The learning behavior of variable-structure stochastic automata in a three-person zero-sum game is investigated. The game has three variable-structure stochastic automata and a random environment. In the game the players do not possess prior information concerning the payoff matrix, and at the end of every play all the players update their own strategies on the basis of the response from the random environment. Under such situations, if a payoff matrix satisfies some conditions, it can be shown that the learning behavior of the automata converges to the optimal strategies.
proach is in the fact that in printed images the fundamental dot texture frequencies are usually relatively close to the resolution limit of the visual system. On the other hand, in computer displays dot textures are usually clearly visible because of larger pixel sizes. It is not clear yet whether the present method can be applied to the latter case or not. Instead of calculated resolution frequencies, calculated contrast responses for dot textures with a given fundamental frequency (left side of (7)) might be more appropriate for describing the disturbances caused by visible dot textures.
The perceptual quality of halftone images is based on many factors such as the visibility of dot textures, the perceived image sharpness, and the undesirability of visible dot textures. For the ordered dither technique, the problem is to find dither signals for which these factors are in optimum relation with each other. This optimization involves quantitative measures for the quality factors. This correspondence gives a calculational method for quantitatively evaluating one of these factors, the visibility of halftone dot textures.
ApPENDIX: FOURIER SERIES COEFFICIENTS FOR PERIODIC HALFTONE DOT TEXTURES
For a periodic waveform g( x) with period T Fourier series coefficients are
F(u) = !fT/2 g(x)e-j27TUX/T dx; T -T/2 u=0,±1,±2,±3···.
One-dimensional halftone dot patterns can be described as ·e-j27TUX/(NR) dx.
The integration gives the Fourier transform of the reef-function. The Fourier transform of a not shifted reef-function reef (xIR) is R sine (uIN).
When the rect-function is shifted by nR the Fourier transform has to be multiplied by exp (-j2'l1'nRu/(NR)) according to the shift theorem. After substitution and reduction we have The extension to two dimensions is straightforward.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The learning behavior of variable-structure stochastic automata operating in a random environment has been studied extensively by many authors [1] - [8] . These automata have the capability of learning the desired state by updating their probabilities of actions. Since Chandrasekan and Shen [2] studied the behavior of variable-structure stochastic automata in two-person zero-sum games, various papers on automata games have been published.
Lakshmivarahan and Narendra [6] show that the learning behavior of variable-structure stochastic automata converges to the optimal pure strategies when the game matrix has a saddle point.
However, most of the work in competitive games has been limited to two-person zero-sum games. 
II. FORMULATION OF LEARNING AUTOMATON
The definitions associated with a variable-structure stochastic automaton in a random environment and a reinforcement are presented here.
The variable-structure stochastic automaton (VSSA) A is defined by the sextuple (see Fig. 1) This correspondence investigates the learning behavior of variable-structure stochastic automata that takes part in a three-person zero-sum game as the players. In two-person zero-sum games, a gain of one player corresponds to a loss of another player, however, in three-person zero-sum game this relation is not satisfied, and the payoffs of the players affect each other.
In the game the players don't possess prior information concerning the payoff matrix and the available strategies, and during the course of the game all the players update their strategies using their reinforcement on the basis of the response from the environment. At every play the environment responds to the automaton's action by producing a response. Under such situations, when a payoff matrix satisfies some conditions given in Section IV, the learning behavior of the automata converges to the optimal strategies.
After a brief introduction to the variable-structure stochastic automaton, the outline of automata game is stated in Section III. Further, some solutions as the set of optimal strategies in threeperson zero-sum game are defined, and the collective behavior of stochastic automata in the game having the solution is studied in Section IV. Finally, as illustrative examples, some games are simulated on a computer in Section V.
In the sense of game theory, we can see the outputs of A as its strategies, the inputs of A as its payoffs, and the environment as a referee of a game. With these meanings, we describe the three-automaton game in the next section. III. THREE-PERSON ZERO-SUM GAME OF AUTOMATA
In this section a three-person zero-sum game of automata is stated. Fig. 2 describes schematically the three-automaton game. The game has three VSSA as its players and a environment as its referee.
Let Al (1~I~3) be a player in the game. Al has r l outputs (strategies)
where P is a parameter affecting the rate of learning.
The basic idea behind L R -l scheme is the following. If A chooses the state Wi at instant t and the environment outputs a reward, the state probability Pi(t) is increased, and the other components of 9'( t) is decreased so that 9'( t) is stochastic. For a penalty, 9"(t) is not changed. Thus, A updates 9'(t) with L R -l scheme on the basis of the output of A and the response from the environment as much as possible to receive the reward.
where X = {O, I} is the set of two inputs (0 denotes reward; 1 denotes penalty), Y = {Yl' Y2" . " Yrr (r~2) is the set of r outputs, W = {WI' W2" . " w r } is the set of r states, g is the output function f = g( Wi) (1~i~r), which is a one-to-one mapping from the state set to the output set. In this correspondence the states of the automaton are regarded as identical with the outputs. The vector 9'( t) = (PI (t), P2(t),. . " Pr(t)) O:~=lPi(t) = 1) is the state probability vector at instant t, where Pi(t) denotes the probability of the choice of the zth state Wi' T defines the reinforcement scheme that generates 9'(t + 1) from 9'( t). T can be written formally
where it is also said that the environment gives the reward out with the probability 1 -C/'J,k' Each player changes its output probability vector 9"/(t) to 9"/(t + 1) using the reinforcement scheme as much as possible to receive the reward on the basis of the response from the environment. The tth play is done in this way, and this play is made sequentially.
Ih this three-person zero-sum game, all the players possess no prior information concerning the game, and each player chooses its output without knowing the other players' outputs. Therefore these things mean that the players do not know the payoff matrix and the number of' players participating in the game. And the only available information concerning the game for each player is the response from the environment.
lIh (1) , g is one-to-one mapping from the set of states to the set of outputs, so states and outputs are regarded synonymous; thus we don't describe the state of AI especially.
where t (t > 0) denotes the number of plays, and pf(t) denotes the probability with which Al chooses the zth output y/.
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The environment (referee) determines the payoffs u'«, j, k) (1~I~3) to three players depending on the play {yl, 1./' y1} and the payoff matrix M. M specifies the payoffs to three players corresponding to r( r = r 1 r 2 r 3 ) kinds of plays and is the r X 3 matrix. Then the environment gives the penalty out to the player Al in a random manner with the probability
If at an instant each player chooses yl, 1./ and vi, respectively, {yl, 1./'Yk} is a play at this time. During the game such plays are repeated continuously.
Next, let the output probability vector (mixed strategy) of player Al be (4) (2) 1~j~r
where X(t) and W(t) denote the input and the state of the automaton at instant t, respectively.
A number of reinforcement schemes such as [5] ; in this correspondence the linear reward-inaction scheme L R -l that is described in the following is used.
Let the automaton choose the state Wi at instant t. If the environment responds with 1) reward (zero), then set
2) penalty (one), then set This definition can be given in the same way for other players. The element of the set X n = {(yll' rl ,Yi ), (yl, y/' yi ), 
M(il,jll,k nl)~M (il,jll,k),
This definition can be given in the same way for other players. The element of the set
said the equilibrium point E II I of the game.
For these equilibrium points we have the following proposition.
Proposition 1: Let M I , Mil' and MIll be the set of the payoff matrix having E I , Ell' and E II I , respectively. Then
proof. It is clear from definition 1, 2, and 3.
Q.E.D In the game having the equilibrium point stated in definition 1, 2, and 3, when all the players update their own output probability
In the subsequent discussion we assume that, for each I, i (1~1~3, 1~i~r), initial output probability p/(1) is positive.
IV. COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR OF AUTOMATA
In this section some solutions of three-person zero-sum game and the collective behaivor of variable-structure stochastic automata in the game having the solution are stated.
Equilibrium Point
We define equilibrium points E I , En and E n l as the sets of optimal strategies. For these solutions there must exist a dominant strategy d l for at least one player. Note that this strategy implies that for any fixed pure strategies of other players the payoff of this strategy is greater than the corresponding payoff.
Definition 1-Equilibrium Point Ej: yll is said to be the dominant strategy d I of Al if for all j, for all k (1~j~r 2 , 1~k~r 3 ) i=l=i l. (8) This definition can be given in the same way for other players. The pure strategies XI = (yl , yl, yi) is said the equilibrium point E I of the game.
I . I I
Definition 2-Equilibrium Point Ell: When there exists a dominant strategy d l of Al yl, yj2 is said to be the dominant strategy
Substituting (13) into (12) yields
where for simplicity we put P; = p;(t), and ,8(0 < ,8 < 1) is the parameter of L R -I scheme used by AI' In (12) C;,j,k denotes the probability that Al receives a penalty when each player chooses the output yl, yj2 and vi. respectively, and from (7) 
vectors using L R _ I schemes on the basis of the response from the environment, we have the following theorems. Theorem 1: In a game having the equilibrium point E I , if all the players update their own output probability vectors using L R _ I schemes, the collective behavior of the players converges to the equilibrium point E I with positive probability.
This implies that P;I (t) in (6) satisfies for all ( (e > 0)
Since yl l is the dominant strategy d l of AI' (8) must be satisfied. Thus, it follows from (8) and (14) that for all t( t > 0) Q 
)=lk=l ( (1) converges to unity with positive probability proved in (16) . And in this time the conditional expection of the random variable 1j;I is given by
10)
Note that Yj ;I is the dominant strategy d n of A 2 -From (9) and (17) for all 1 (t > 0) the random variable P~P~P: is given by
where
and for simplicity we put
so on. The derivation of (21) Theorem 3: In a game where there exists the equilibrium point E n l , if all the players update their own output probability vectors using L R -I schemes, the collective behavior of the players converges to the equilibrium point E n l with positive probability.
Proof:
The proof is similar to theorem 2.
Q.E.D The solutions in definitions 1-, 2, and 3 have the dominant strategy d l and the every payoff of this strategy is greater than the corresponding payoff of all the other strategies. There rarely exists such a strategy in the game situation, so the equilibrium points E I , En, and E n l are the particular solutions.
Saddle Point
Adding to the solutions stated in definitions 1, 2, and 3, we define the saddle point in three person zero-sum game as a solution.
Definition 4-Saddle Point: Let The saddle point S is more practical than the equilibrium points E 1 , En, and E In in the meaning that all the players behave so as to minimize the payoffs of other two players and maximize the own payoff.
In a game having the saddle point S, when all the players update their own output probability vectors using L~-l schemes, we then have the following theorem.
Theorem 4: In a' game' having the saddle point S, if all the players update their own output probability vectors using L R -I schemes with a proper parameter, the collective behavior of the players converges to the saddle point S with positive probability.
Proof: Let S= (y~,yl,'y(~) be a saddle point. When all the players update their own output probability vectors using L R -I schemes with the same parameter, the conditional expection of
(26) such that
From (20) and (28), for a proper parameter it is clearly that
where the equality sign holds only at p~= p~= p! = 0 or 1. This completes the proof of the theorem. Q.E.D. As the well known there is a Nash play defined as a solution of N person zero-sum game. The solutions defined in definitionI, 2, 3, and 4 are all the Nash plays. Let M N , M I , MIl' MIll' and M, be the sets of the payoff matrices having the Nash play, the equalibrium points E I , En, E II I and the saddle point, respectively. Then the relation given in Fig. 3 is satisfied. And it is clearly that the solutions stated in definition 1, 2, 3, and 4 are the optimal plays.
v. SIMULATION To illustrate the collective behavior of the automata in the last section, computer simulations are carried out. In all examples reported below it is assumed that each player has .the set of two outputs {1,2} and they use L R -I schemes with same parameter p~~Each game is played ten times and the averaged probabilities with which each player chooses the optimal strategy are shown in Figs. 4-8 .
The payoff matrices used in the simulation are given in Tables  I-IV . And it is assumed that each player's payoff is in [-1,1] . The payoff matrix given in Table I , has the equilibrium point  E 1(1, 1, 1) . The behavior of the automata in this game is shown in Fig. 4 . The probabilities p{(t) (1~I~3) with which each 
Yi Y j Y k 
Yi Yj Y k automaton chooses the output 1 converge to unity in all ten experiments. The payoff matrix dIl' and dIll' respectively. The behavior of the automata in the games having the payoff matrices Table II and Table III and dIl. From these relations it might be said that the less the influence of other players' behavior is, the faster the convergence is.
The payoff matrix given in Table IV has the saddle point S (1,1,1) . The behaviors of the automata using L R -I schemes with the parameter f3 = 0.04 and 0.08 in the game having Table IV are shown in Figs. 7 and 8 , respectively. In the case f3 = 0.04 the behavior of the automata converges to the saddle point S in all ten experiments. In the case f3 = 0.08 the automata fail to learn in some experiments. For example, pi converges to 0.7 in Fig. 8 and this shows that A 1 fails to learn three times. These behaviors coincide with the results described in the last section.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this correspondence we defined some solutions in three-person zero-sum game. And it has been shown that the players having no prior information about the game learn the solution when they update their own output probability vectors using L R _ I schemes on the basis of the response from the environment.
These results will be easily extended to N-person zero-sum game.
In the following, we show the problems to be considered further:
1) the study of cooperative games of automata; 2) the scheme that an optimal strategy is a mixed one.
ApPENDIX
Derivation of (21) Let S = (y~, y;, y?) be a saddle point. When all the players update their own output probability vectors using L R -I schemes with the same parameter f3, the conditional expection of the random variable p~P~P; is given by E { p~( t + 1) p~(t + 1) P; (t + 1) 1.9( r) } Deleting the term p~P~P;' of (33), we have (21).
(30)
